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Abstract 
We present a System Dynamics (SD) model of the Covid-19 pandemic spread in India. The 
detailed age-structured compartment-based model endogenously captures various disease 
transmission pathways, expanding significantly from the standard SEIR model. The model is 
customized for India by using the appropriate population pyramid, contact rate matrices, 
external arrivals (as per actual data), and a few other calibrated fractions based on the 
reported cases of Covid-19 in India.  Also, we have explicitly modeled, using independent 
time-variant levers, the effects of testing, contact tracing, isolating Covid-positive patients, 
quarantining, use of mask/better hygiene practices, social distancing through contact rate 
reductions at distinct zones of home(H), work(W), school(S) and other(O) locations.  
Simulation results show that, even after an extended lock-down, some non-trivial number of 
infections (even asymptomatic) will be left and the pandemic will resurface. Only tools that 
work against the pandemic is high rate of testing of those who show Covid-19 like symptoms, 
isolating them if they are positive and contact tracing all contacts of positive patients and 
quarantining them, in combination with use of face masks and personal hygiene. A wide range 
of combination of effectiveness of contact tracing, isolation, quarantining and personal 
hygiene measures help minimize the pandemic impact and some imperfections in 
implementation of one measure can be compensated by better implementation of other 
measures.  
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1. Introduction 
A mathematical model of Covid-19 pandemic in India, based on System Dynamics (SD) 
methodology is presented. Our SD based epidemiological model explicitly captures the 
disease progression pathways, intervention pathways, causal linkages, and assumptions. 
Systems Dynamics approach has its origins in the study of industrial dynamics by Jay Forrester 
of MIT, in the late 1950s. In 1960s and 70s, several seminal works such as Limits to Growth, 
Urban Dynamics, and World Dynamics emerged. More recently, the C-ROADS World Climate 
Policy model, developed using an SD approach to understand the long-term climate effects, 
has been widely adopted.  
 
SD Philosophy emphasizes capturing real world processes, causal pathways and endogenous 
feedback. The structure of an SD model must correspond to real world entities at appropriate 
level of abstraction and aggregation. The entity flows in the model must respect conservation 
laws, resource constraints, and known delays in real life. The parameters of the model must 
have a corresponding real-world interpretation and must come from domain knowledge, or, 
when estimated from data, must fall within plausible range.  
 
Our model is an extension of the classic SEIR (Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered) 
model (Anderson and May 1992). It is a compartmental model of the pandemic, wherein the 
population is divided into various age group wise ‘compartments’ to indicate Covid-19 disease 
progression and the interventions. Within each compartment, population is assumed to be 
homogeneous without and spatial or temporal attributes. While there are a number of SIR 
based models (Lourenco et. all. 2020; Ghaffarzadegan and Rahmandad 2020, MedRxiv 2020), 
our model differs from them not just in much more detailed modeling of various stages of 
disease progression, but also differs in explicit modeling of quarantining and isolation of both 
symptomatics and asymptomatics under key interventions of Testing and Contact Tracing. 
We also have a much more detailed model of the healthcare subsystem that is absent in 
almost all other models. Unlike (Ghaffarzadegan and Rahmandad 2020), we do not assume 
any seasonality effect of temperature and humidity since the evidence on it is thin and we 
would rather be conservative. 
 
Given the time pressure, rapidly evolving data and uncertainties about virus infectivity and 
duration of various disease progression stages, SD is a good choice for evaluating policy 
interventions since it allows easy enlargement of model boundaries to incorporate hygiene 
practices, healthcare staff shortage, and behavioral feedbacks. The accuracy of absolute 
numbers generated by the model depend greatly on how accurate structural assumptions, 
assumed/estimated parameters, and input data, are. As long as the parameters and input 
data get the relative numbers and trends right, we can compare the relative impact of various 
policy interventions and learn which interventions or intervention combinations are most 
likely to take the system to desired state. This is particularly critical when almost 
simultaneously estimation of number of current infections in UK from very well-respected 
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research teams (Lourenco et. all. 2020; Ferguson et. al. 2020) differ by orders of magnitude. 
Similar order of magnitude difference in number of infections are noted for Santa Clara 
county in Califorina (Bendavid, et al. 2020) 
 
SD framework makes incorporating behavioral feedback possible. For example, as the 
number of infections cases rise, people may adopt better personal hygiene. Behavioral 
feedback is also important to model the counter-intuitive behavior of social systems and 
possible policy resistance. The success of a prolonged lockdown may come at the cost of 
wearing people down and they may stop following any containment measures resulting in a 
much worse second wave of pandemic. Also, the strict Covid-containment measures may 
inflict high collateral damage from other diseases. The devastating economic impact of strict 
measures may make people desperate and more vulnerable if their health and nutritional 
levels suffer.  Due to time pressure many such scenarios are not incorporated here but must 
be kept in mind when making policy choices. 
 
The rest of the report is organised as follows. First, we list out the assumptions as they also 
define the ability of our model. Next, we broadly describe our proposed model, along with 
the model validation/ usage of data. Third, we present our experimental findings based on 
simulations for multiple states of India. We then conclude with a brief discussion of our 
findings. 
 
 
2. Modelling Assumptions 
Like most models of SIR family, we also model the probability of movement of people from 
one compartment to other in a given time-step as independent of the residence time. Hence 
ours is a memory-less model in that residence time in each compartment is exponentially 
distributed. However, note that infectiousness of an individual is not uniform between 
exposure and recovery. It is initially negligible and gets hold up to 48 hours before the 
symptoms set in (Bai et. al. 2020; He and Lou et. al. 2020). As suggested in (Jacquez and Simon 
2002), we take care of the limitations of the exponential distribution by introducing by 
breaking ‘infectious’ compartment in exposed, asymptomatic infectious, and Infectious 
symptomatics. 
 
General assumptions with regards to our model are as follows: 
• The population is assumed to be homogeneous and well-mixed. And there is no 
significant change on the total population due to births and deaths. 
• The population (people) interacts at various locations that can be broadly divided into 
four sphere/ zone: at home, at work, at school and at other locations. 
• The interactions are age-dependent. For example:  we can expect high interaction 
among 5-20 year olds at schools, while 30-60 year olds may interact more at work. 
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• Patients infected by the coronavirus take some time (incubation period of ~ 5 days) 
before they show any symptoms. During this asymptomatic/ pre-symptomatic phase, 
they are assumed infective a few days prior (~24 to 48 hours prior) to the onset of 
symptoms. 
• Symptomatic individuals may recover after a mild illness, or become serious and 
require hospitalisation. Serious patients may recover or can become critical (requiring 
ventilator / ICU facilities). The critical patients can recover or, unfortunately, die. 
• The infectiveness of the asymptomatic individuals are assumed to be lower than that 
of the symptomatic individuals. 
• Asymptomatic individuals may also recover from the disease without showing 
symptoms. 
• The progression of the disease is age-dependent. Co-morbidity is assumed to be 
implicitly captured by this. 
• The new cases are assumed to be detected only when the individuals are tested 
positive.  This happens when either, (i) mild symptomatic individuals are tested  
positive, or (ii) the disease worsens and the patient seeks treatment at hospital, at 
which point it in time, they are tested and found positive.   
 
Assumptions with regards to India-specific pandemic progress are as follows: 
• The data about state-wise daily reported cases, recovered patients, and deaths, was 
obtained from www.covid19india.org. 
• The disease is assumed to be imported to the country through arriving passengers only 
(as per the ‘imported cases’ reported in above link). 
• It is assumed that the weather & climatic conditions of India play no role in the disease 
transmissions/ infectiousness.  Also, it is assumed that the immunity level of Indians is 
similar to the people across the globe; and vaccinations such as BCG etc does not affect 
the infectiousness of the disease. 
• Lockdown is assumed to reduce the interaction at work and other locations by 80% (with 
the remaining 20% representing essential services and front-line workers), and also result 
in 100% reduction in school zone interactions. 
• The naïve ratio of the total number of deaths divided by the total cases reported, is at 
3.4% for India which is very high. The case fatality ratio depends on the duration of illness 
and is hard to estimate without accurate patient records.  The high deaths reported in 
India could be due to delay in seeking treatment by the patients (due to which the disease 
might have progressed to critical state thus hastening death), or due to the prior medical 
conditions of the patients, or due to delays in initial testing and reporting.   
 
Other modelling assumptions: 
• In national level ‘All-India’ model, the interaction among states is assumed to be implicit.  
• The state level models are considered independent of each other, i.e., no interactions 
among states is assumed. 
  5 
• Super spreader events are not explicitly considered. 
• Economic effects are not directly considered. 
• Once lockdown is lifted, no further imported cases are assumed to occur. This can be 
thought of as a policy choice. While some researchers have argued that once community 
transmission sets in, imported cases do not make much difference (Chinazzi et. al. 2020), 
recent experience of Vietnam, Singapore and China seem to contradict it. Hence we take 
no new import as a policy decision for the current scope of our work. 
 
Definition Used: 
• Infectivity: It represents the probability of an individual contracting the disease upon 
interaction with an infected person. 
• Contact Rate: It represents the average number of persons a person interacts with in 
a day. 
 
These two definitions are particularly important in that they relate to the concept of the 
popular but often misunderstood R0, the basic Reproduction Number. It refers to the 
expected number of individuals, a single infected individual directly infects when introduced 
in a fully susceptible population, in absence of external interventions. Its average value is 
computed as the product of the number of interactions per day between an infected and a 
susceptible person, the probability of infection in such an interaction, and the duration where 
the person stays infectious. Human to fomite (inanimate infectious objects) contacts are 
usually not modelled separately and are supposed to be subsumed in these averages.  
 
This tells us that to reduce disease transmission we can target any of the three components 
of R0. Interventions like social distancing, quarantine, isolation, and lockdowns affect the 
number of interactions, medical interventions can reduce the disease duration, while the use 
of masks, PPE, and better hygiene can reduce the infectivity. Infectivity is thought to be a 
property of the virus but it also depends on the intensity of the interactions (in addition to 
the virus property, and immunity against virus, and other conjectures such as 
temperature/humidity etc). Both the number of interaction and its intensity (as a function of 
physical distance) is affected by population density. Hence both the social customs and 
behaviours and spatial characters of a region will affect R0. All of this means R0 computed for 
a region cannot be blindly used in another region. In this work, we address these issues by 
calibrating the model for contact rates and impact of hygiene on infectivity. 
 
 
3. Model Description 
A high level stock-flow diagram of the proposed model is shown in Figure 1. We assume the 
population of the region is age-stratified into M age-groups. The population within each age 
group is divided into Susceptibles (S), Exposed(E), Asymptomatic infectives (A), Infectious 
Symptomatic (I) cases, Hospitalised patients (H), Critical patients (C), Recovered (R) population 
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and the Dead (D).  The governing equations of the model are described in detail in Appendix 
A. 
 
 
Figure 1: High level stock flow diagram of the proposed model for Covid-19 India pandemic. The intervention points are 
represented by causal variables shown in red color.  Other causal variables, especially delays, are not shown to improve 
readability. 
 
Let’s consider the ‘primary flow’ of the diseases across the compartments, that is, ignoring 
quarantine and isolations. The Susceptible (S) people get exposed to the virus from contact 
with an infectious person. Initially all those exposed to virus are non-symptomatic and non-
infectives, and become infective (but not symptomatic) only after a latency period of dEA days. 
After another dAI days, these individuals develop symptoms and move to Infectious 
Symptomatics compartment. The sum of dEA and dAI represents the average incubation 
period, dP. The persons in Infectious Symptomatics compartment are said to exhibit mild 
symptoms and are active in the community, and thus continue to transmit the virus.  A 
fraction of such mild cases recovers, while for others, the disease worsens resulting in 
hospitalization (move to Hospitalised patients class). A fraction of the serious hospitalised 
patients recovers, while the rest become critical requiring ventilator / ICU facilities (move to 
Critical patients class). A fraction of the critical patients recover while the rest, unfortunately, 
die.  It is assumed that the Recovered patients and the Dead do not transmit the virus. Note 
that the external seeding of the virus in the community is captured explicitly. 
 
Now, suppose quarantining and isolations of infectious persons are possible. This is explicitly 
captured by the flows out of the stocks A and I. The flow to the Quarantine and Isolation 
stocks are modeled as governed by different control fractions. The flow of asymptomatics 
from A to QA represents the proportion of persons who are quarantined either through 
awareness efforts (represented by f1(t)) or contact tracing of a positive tested patients 
(represented by fX(t)).  The flow of asymptomatics from A to LA represents the proportion of 
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persons who are isolated after testing positive for Covid-19 though early tracing and testing 
effort (represented by f2(t)).  The quarantined/ isolated asymptomatics, either recovers, or 
develop symptoms and proceed to the quarantined Symptomatic and Isolated Symptomatic 
stocks. The flow of Infectious Symptomatics from I to QI represents the proportion of persons 
who are quarantined through awareness efforts (represented by f3(t))).  The flow of 
symptomatics from I to LI represents the proportion of persons who are isolated after testing 
positive for Covid-19 (represented by f4(t)).  This, f4(t), represents the fraction of symptomatic 
individuals who are identified during the initial stages of the symptoms itself. The 
quarantined/ isolated symptomatics, either recover, or become serious and are hospitalised. 
Note that the patients who are not quarantined or not isolated proceed along the primary 
flow a described earlier. The flow equations are given by equations 22-52 in Appendix A. Also, 
note that all the flows are governed by explicit delays between stages, some of which are 
determined by the nature of the disease (viz., incubation period), while others are determined 
by the intervention or control action (viz., testing delay). 
 
The infection rate is governed by the contact rate (λ) and the infectivity (infection probability, 
p), as shown in Equations 16-21 in Appendix A. The contact rate for an age-group is the sum 
of all interactions of that age group with all other age groups across all contact locations 
(home, work, school and other).  It is assumed that a susceptible individual can get infected 
upon contact with an Asymptotic infective, or Infectious Symptomatics person, including 
those in quarantine and isolation. It is assumed that the relative infectivity of the 
Asymptomatic infectives is only (1-k)% of the symptomatic infected class. Further, it assumed 
that patients in hospitals and critical care are in perfect isolation and hence do not contribute 
to the disease transmission.  
 
Social distancing measures, such as school closures, lockdown, partial opening of work, etc, 
are modeled using fractions uH(t), uW(t), uS(t), uO(t), which represent the time dependent 
control measure imposed on contacts at home(H), work(W), school(S) and other(O) locations, 
respectively.  Reductions in the infectivity due to measures such as personal hygiene, usage 
of PPE such as masks, etc., is modeled using fraction multiplier v(t) on the base infectivity 
parameter p. Additionally, a time dependent adjustment factor y(t) is used as a multiplier of 
contact rate, Cij.  At the start of the Covid-19 pandemic there is typically little awareness about 
the diseases, and hence little or no precautions are taken by the population. This can result 
in an increased interaction, more than what would have otherwise been. 
 
Further, in the model, the overflows that can possibly occur at hospitals is explicitly modelled. 
The area shown by the dashed box in Figure 1 is expanded in the main model, as shown in 
Figure 2.  The overflows at hospitals and Critical care facilities are explicitly modelled to 
capture the possible deterioration in the care due to overwhelming demand on the hospital. 
The flows DPR, QDPR, LDPR, represent the ‘new arrivals’ to the hospitals, feeding into the 
stock DH.  Now, as per the available capacity (KH) at the hospital, that many patients are sent 
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immediately to the hospital stock H, while the rest are explicitly marked as overflow hospital 
patients and moved to stock OH. (Note: both these class of patients could be physically at the 
hospital itself). Similarly, the patients at the hospital (stock H), as their condition worsens, can 
go to critical care facility if there is sufficient capacity (KC). If not, the patient ‘move’ to 
overflow critical patients (OC). The OH patients can worsen (become critical) or recover, 
where the fraction recovering could be lower than that for the regular ‘H’ patients.  The OC 
patients can die or recover, where the fraction recovering could be lower than that for the 
regular ‘C’ patients. 
 
 
Figure 2: Expanded view of the hospital incorporating overflows 
 
 
 
4. Parameter settings 
The model parameter settings are based on published reports and web sources (see 
Assumptions section), as follows: 
 
Table 1:  Parameter settings used 
Parameters Value(s) Source 
 
Population parameter 
Age-groups, i 16 (with bands of 5 years starting at 0. The last band is 
assumed to be include all who are 75+) 
 
Population fraction, 
gi 
0.086, 0.088, 0.093, 0.092, 0.089, 0.085, 0.084, 0.074, 
0.064, 0.057, 0.049, 0.043, 0.035, 0.026, 0.017, 0.018; 
Census 2011 
Populations Population of all states, taken as 2018 values, from: 
http://statisticstimes.com/demographics/population-of-
indian-states.php  
 
Demand on
Hospital (DH)
Critical
patients(C) Recovered(R)
Dead(D)
Disease
progress
rate(DPR)
Critical care
Recoveries(CRR)
Dying(DR)
Q Disease
progress
rate(QDPR)
Isolated Disease
progress
rate(LDPR)
fraction becoming
critical(fc)
fraction dying(fd)
Hospitalised
patientsts(H)
Overflow
Hospital
patients (OH)
Hospital
admission
rate (HAR)
Hospital admissions
overflow (HAOR)
Hospital capacity K^h
Overflow
Critical
patients (OC)
Critical admissions
Critical admissions
overflow (CAOR)
Critical care
capacity K^c
Overflows
Worsening Rate
(OWR)
Hosp
Recovering(HRR)
Overflow Hospital
Recovering (OHRR)
Overflow Critical care
recoveries (OCRR)
Overflow Dying (ODR)
Worsening Rate(WR)
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Fractions 
Fraction developing 
symptoms, 𝑓𝑖
𝑆 
0.8, for all age groups Verity et. al. 
2020 
Fraction becoming 
serious, 𝑓𝑖
𝐻 
0.02, 0.02, 0.02, 0.02, 0.17, 0.17, 0.17, 0.17, 0.17, 0.28, 
0.28, 0.27, 0.27, 0.4, 0.4, 0.47 
CDC report 
2020 
Fraction becoming 
critical , 𝑓𝑖
𝐶  
0, 0, 0, 0, 0.14, 0.14, 0.14, 0.14, 0.14, 0.23, 0.23, 0.24, 0.24, 
0.28, 0.28, 0.34.  
(fraction 𝑓𝑖
𝐶𝑂= min(0.8, 2*𝑓𝑖
𝐶 , ) 
Fraction dying, 𝑓𝑖
𝐷  0.02, 0.02, 0.02, 0.02, 0.06, 0.06, 0.06, 0.06, 0.06, 0.11, 
0.11, 0.25, 0.25, 0.26, 0.26, 0.3   
(fraction 𝑓𝑖
𝐷𝑂= min(0.9, 2*𝑓𝑖
𝐷) 
 
Infectivity and Contacts 
Base infectivity, ?̂? 0.015 Singh and 
Adhikari 2020 
Reduction in infectiousness of asymptomatics, k 0.5 Average of 
various sources 
Contact Matrices  See Appendix B  
 
Delay Parameters 
Incubation period,  𝑑𝐸𝐴 + 𝑑𝐴𝐼 5 days Personal 
communication 
with doctors; 
Multiple source 
Latency period, 𝑑𝐸𝐴 3 days 
Avg. time to develop symptoms, 𝑑𝐴𝐼 5 – 3 = 2 days 
Avg. time for asymptomatics to recover, 𝑑𝐴𝑅 11 days 
Avg. time for infectious Symptomatics to become serious/ 
hospitalise, 𝑑𝐼𝐻 
5 days 
Avg. time for infectious Symptomatics to recover, 𝑑𝐼𝑅 14 days 
Avg. worsening duration, 𝑑𝐻𝐶 5 days 
Avg. time for hospitalised patients to recover, 𝑑𝐻𝑅 14 days 
Avg. time for critical patients to die 𝑑𝐶𝑅 5 days 
Avg. time for critical patients to recover 𝑑𝐶𝑅  14 days 
Avg. time to quarantine / isolate asymptomatics,  𝑑𝐴𝑄, 𝑑𝐴𝐿 1 day (assumed half 
of 𝑑𝐴𝐼) 
 
Avg. time to quarantine / isolate symptomatics, 𝑑𝐼𝑄, 𝑑𝐼𝐿 2.5 days (assumed 
half of 𝑑𝐴𝐼) 
 
Avg. time for quarantine / isolate asymptomatics to 
develop symptoms, 𝑑𝑄𝑄, 𝑑𝐿𝐿 
1 day 
 (𝑑𝐴𝐼 − 𝑑𝐴𝑄) 
 
Avg. time for quarantine / isolate symptomatics to 
become serious/ hospitalise, 𝑑𝑄𝐻 , 𝑑𝐿𝐻 
2.5 days 
 (𝑑𝐼𝐻 − 𝑑𝐼𝑄) 
 
Avg. time for quarantine / isolate asymptomatics to 
recover, 𝑑𝑄𝐴𝑅 , 𝑑𝐿𝐴𝑅 
10 days 
 (𝑑𝐴𝑅 − 𝑑𝐴𝑄) 
 
Avg. time for quarantine / isolate symptomatics to 
become serious/ hospitalise, 𝑑𝑄𝐼𝑅 , 𝑑𝐿𝐼𝑅 
13 days 
 (𝑑𝐼𝑅 − 𝑑𝐼𝑄) 
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5. Simulation and Model Validation  
The model has been implemented using Vensim® Pro software. Some additional variables 
have been included in the Vensim model, mainly to capture a few of the underlying equations 
in parts. A simulation timestep of 0.0625 is used, with integration method of Euler. Results 
are saved per day. 
 
The model has been thoroughly debugged to avoid integration time step errors, and floating 
point overflow caused by extreme small value (e.g. 0 in the denominator). The units have 
been checked to ensure consistency. Variable names have been chosen so that the model is 
understandable.   
 
As part of model validation, direct structure tests have been conducted to ensure that 
relations & assumptions in the model are based on accepted theories and all important 
variables are included in the model. As per that, an essential feature included in our model is 
that a coronavirus infected person undergoes an incubation period before symptoms show 
up; and during the incubation period they are infectious (without showing symptoms) after a 
latency period.  Other aspects included, which goes beyond the standard SEIR representation 
of Covid-19 are, the age-groups specific contacts across various contact zones or locations; 
age specific progression of & recovery from the disease; and explicit representation of 
quarantines and isolations. Behavior tests were conducted to ensure that the model behaves 
as per accepted System Dynamics theory at various test conditions, extreme values and loop 
knockouts. 
 
 
6. Modelling the observed pandemic behaviour in India and Sensitivity 
Analysis 
A conscious decision was taken by the modelers to not fine-tune the parameter values to 
exactly replicate the reported cases of Covid-19 in India, or to minimise some statistical 
measure of error. Instead it was decided to replicate the trend in behaviour by estimating a 
few parameters only (McCloskey and Ziliak 1996). 
 
On the website www.covid19india.org, the India state-wise data on daily number of (newly) 
reported cases based on test reports, daily number of recovered cases, and daily number of 
deaths are reported. The first 3 recorded cases of Covid-19 infections were during Jan 30th – 
Feb 3rd 2020, followed by a long hiatus. Since March 2nd 2020, India has been seeing new cases 
reported daily. For modelling purposes the early February data is ignored. Also, the current 
deaths reported in India is quite high vis-à-vis the reported cases, and compared to the fatality 
rates reported in [CDC report]. This could be due to initial long delay in seeking proper 
treatment, comorbidity conditions, etc. Hence it is decided to calibrate the model based on 
the new cases reported only. 
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In our model, there are two pathways by which a new case of Covid-19 is identified/ 
confirmed via testing. One pathway is when the individual allows the disease to progress, and 
seek medical help only when it becomes severe. This is captured by the flow Disease Progress 
Rate (DPR) from Infectious Symptomatic (I) to Hospitalized Patients (H) compartments. Such 
patients are tested positive late after the onset of the disease. The second pathway will be 
to, via contact tracing, test some symptomatic individuals a priori before the symptoms 
become severe.  This is captured by the flow Isolating Symptomatics Rate (LIR) from Infectious 
Symptomatic (I) to Isolated Symptomatics (LI) compartments.  This is governed by the fraction 
f4(t). Now, the data available in the website does not distinguish between the two pathways. 
It is important to do so, since pathway 1 is reactive, while pathway 2 is a proactive approach.  
It is assumed that pathway 1 is active be default, and hence only f4(t) is estimated in our 
model. 
 
As far as the authors are aware, there are no detailed published clinical studies of the cases 
in India. In the absence of that, the parameters reported in Section 4.0 are assumed to hold 
true for India. Also, India has already started various interventions to mitigate/ prevent the 
pandemic spread. Based on reported studies and preliminary experiments, we decided 
estimate the following parameters only to replicate the trend in the daily reported cases: 
(i) Control measures of uH(t), uW(t), uS(t), uO(t), to indicate the effect of lockdown. 
Prior to lockdown they were set at 1. During lockdown, assumed that uH(t) = 1 and 
uS(t)=0. 
(ii) The proportion f4(t) of symptomatic infectious individuals who are isolated after 
testing.   
(iii) The fraction x(t) of asymptomatics traced and quarantined per fraction 
symptomatic tested. Note that fraction of asymptomatics traced and quarantined 
is given fx(t) = x(t)*f4(t). 
(iv) The time dependent adjustment factor y(t).  
The parameters, f1(t), and f3(t), are assumed to be 0, implying that volunteer quarantining 
through awareness doesn’t happen. Also, f2(t) is assumed to be 0, implying a no testing policy 
of asymptomatic. Also, the time dependent control measure v(t) for better hygiene and PPE 
use is kept at 1 to indicate no effect of this on Covid-19 spread in India. 
 
Introduction of infected individuals in the community: Since the pandemic did not have 
origins in India. The spread in India is due to arrivals of infected individuals from abroad.  Now, 
in the www.covid19india.org website (crowdsourced database available there), a few of the 
cases has been tagged as ‘imported’.  This is interpreted as those individuals who have arrived 
from abroad infected. Since we do not have the information on the exact arrival date to India, 
we assume that all these ‘imported cases’ came to India on an average of 7 (𝑑𝐴𝐼 + 𝑑𝐼𝐻) days 
prior to being identified as positive.  Thus, for example, the imported patients on March 2nd 
is assumed to have arrived on February 24th. These imported cases arrivals is taken to define 
the flow XAR(t). Also, lockdown is taken to start on 25th March 2020. 
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The results of model calibration exercise is shown in Figure 3 below, for the All India data. The 
simulation duration was from 24th Feb to 14th April. It is observed that the new cases and 
cumulative cases give a reasonable fit to the reported data of the pandemic’s spread in India. 
Also, observe that the simulation over estimates the number recovered and underestimate 
the number dead.  Further calibration of recovered and dead based on current data only has 
a grave risk of over-estimating deaths in future since it appears that people are approaching 
hospitals very late when disease has progressed significantly. We assume that this scenario 
will change as time passes. Also, in future we plan to take comorbidity and patient case details 
for Indian conditions into account. 
  
 
Figure 3: The comparison of simulated (blue line) and the actual data (red line), for the daily reported cases (top left), 
cumulative cases reported (top right), cumulative recovered (bottom). 
The parameter setting that resulted in the above behaviour are: 
(i) During lockdown, uH(t) = 1, uW(t)=0.3, uS(t)=0, uO(t) =0.3, and 1 otherwise. 
(ii) The proportion f4(t) = 0.25 
(iii) The proportion x(t) = 0.1 
(iv) 𝑦(𝑡) = {
2 𝑡 ≤ 15
2 − (
0.8
35
(𝑡 − 15)) 15 < 𝑡 < 50
 
 
Next, sensitivity analysis of the model behaviour to the control parameters were performed, 
the results of which are shown in Figure 4 below. The sensitivity settings are as follows: 
(i) uW(t) ~ UNIFORM(0.2, 0.4)  
(ii) uO(t) ~ UNIFORM(0.2, 0.4)  
(iii) f4(t) ~ UNIFORM(0.05, 0.5) 
(iv) The slope of y(t) ~ UNIFORM(0.8/35, 1/35) 
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It is observed that the model reasonably captures the reported trend even for changes in the 
calibrated values.  During the initial days, the model seems to overestimate the trend. 
However, the more recent behaviour, especially post lockdown, is capture reasonably well. 
Hence, it is decided to calibrate the model with the recommended parameters.  
 
 
Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis confidence bounds (shown by the grey-scale bands) of New Cases Reported (India)  
 
In a manner similar to what was describe for the all India data, the model was calibrated for 
each state (thus each state has a separate model). The results of state-wise calibration are 
shown in Appendix C. 
 
7. Modelling the Interventions  
This section describes the parameter settings used to model different intervention scenarios. 
All interventions are assumed to be effective with effect from April 15th. Until April 15th , the 
parameter setting obtained as in Section 6 are used.   
 
Table 2: Interventions considered 
# Intervention Modeling, t>= Apr 15th 
1 No extension of lockdown after 
14th April 
uH(t) = uW(t)= uS(t)= uO(t) =1 
2 50% reduction in contacts 
everywhere till 15th May 
uH(t)= uW(t)= uS(t)= uO(t)=0.5,  from 15th Apr  to 15th May; 
and 1.0 after that. 
3 Extending the lockdown till 30th 
April 
uH(t)=1, uW(t)=0.3, uS(t)=0, uO(t)=0.3, from 15th to 30th Apr; 
and 1.0 after that. 
4 Extending the lockdown till 30th 
April and during 1st May to 15th 
May 50% reduction in contacts 
(same as 2) 
uH(t)=0.5, uW(t)=0.3, uS(t)=0, uO(t)=0.3, from 15th to 30th Apr;  
uH(t)= uW(t)= uS(t)= uO(t)= 0.5, from 1st to 15th May;  
and 1.0 after that. 
5 Extending lockdown till 15th 
May 
uH(t)=1, uW(t)=0.3, uS(t)=0, uO(t)=0.3, from 15th Apr to 15th  
May; and 1.0 after that. 
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# Intervention Modeling, t>= Apr 15th 
Additional scenarios 
6 50% reduction in contacts, & 
school closed 
uH(t) = uW(t)= uO(t) =0.5, and uS(t)=0 
7 ‘Normal’ contacts, and school 
closed 
uH(t) = uW(t)= uO(t) =1, and uS(t)=0 
 
Each of the above interventions are simulated at two settings of testing and tracing: 
A. With increased testing (testing and tracing; 80% symptomatic can be identified and 
isolated within one day of development of symptoms 
• Modelled with  f4(t) = 0.8, x(t) = 1, for t >= 15th Apr 
• Testing delay dIL continues to be 2.5 days. 
• v(t)=0.8, for t >= 15th Apr (minimal improved level of hygiene and masks usage) 
B. Continue the same rate of testing 
• Modelled with f4(t) = 0.25, x(t) = 0.1 for All India model. For all other states, the 
obtained calibrated values are used. 
• v(t)=0.8, for t >= 15th Apr (minimal improved level of hygiene and masks usage) 
For the additional scenarios (policy 6 and 7) we have considered the following C and D 
settings also. 
 
C. Along with (A), improved use of Face Mask and Personal Hygiene 
• Modelled with  f4(t) = 0.8, x(t) = 1, for t >= 15th Apr 
• Testing delay dIL continues to be 2.5 days. 
• v(t) = 0.6, for t >= 15th Apr 
D. Modified (A), improved use of Face Mask and Personal Hygiene, and lower 
testing/tracing 
• Modelled with f4(t) = 0.5, x(t) = 1 for All India model. For all other states, the 
obtained calibrated values are used. 
• Testing delay dIL continues to be 2.5 days. 
• v(t) = 0.6, for t >= 15th Apr 
Thus, a total of 18 intervention scenarios are considered (1A, 1B, 2A,  …, 5B, 6A, 6B, 6C, 6D, 
7A, 7B, 7C, 7D), for the all India model and for each of the States. 
 
8. Simulation Results and Observations 
The above interventions were encoded, and the model simulated for India as well as each of 
the states.  All simulations were run for a time period until June 30th 2020. Do note that it is 
assumed that no new cases arrive at the state/ country from an external source in the above 
simulation time period. 
 
Figure 5 and 6 shows the simulation outputs for all India data for intervention scenarios 1A to 
5B.  Figure 5 shows that interventions 1B, 2B, 3B, 4B, and 5B (4B and 5B overlaps in figure) 
are significantly more than their ‘A’ counterparts (all overlapping, along the x-axis). This 
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clearly shows that increased testing and tracing and isolating has a significant impact in 
controlling the pandemic spread.  Let’s zoom in (see Figure 6). It can be readily observed from 
Figure 6 that once lockdown is lifted (any of the scenarios 1-5), the new cases reported will 
increase exponentially (all ‘B’ scenarios). The policies 2A, 4A and 5A  seem to result in low 
spread of pandemic, with policy 4A being the least.  Also, it is observed that all the ‘A’ policies, 
1A to 5A will result in a short term increase in the number of reported cases. This is due to 
the larger number of cases that gets discovered initially due to increase in the testing rates. 
 
 
Figure 5: Simulation response based on India data (until June 30th 2020).  
 
Figure 6 Simulation response based on India data (until June 30th 2020), Zoomed in. The lower three lines are 4A, 2A and 5A 
 
The state-wise behaviour for polices 2A, 4A and 5A are show in Figures 7, 8 and 9 respectively.  
All three policies show a similar trends in behaviour. It is observed from Figures that, as a 
result of response either policy (2A, 4A or 5A), the pandemic is well controlled in all states. 
However, MH and DL (top two lines) do show a relatively larger increase that the other states, 
while in KA and KL (bottom two lines), the pandemic is completely under control. The 
projected behaviour for all the other states are somewhere in between these extremes. 
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Figure 7: Simulation output of state wise behavior for policy 2A (50% reduction in contacts till 15th May; and increased 
testing and tracing) 
 
Figure 8: Simulation output of state wise behavior for policy 4A (Extending the lockdown till 30th April and during 1st May to 
15th May 50% reduction in contacts; and increased testing and tracing) 
 
Figure 9: Simulation output of state wise behavior for policy 5A (Extending the lockdown till May 15th; and increased testing 
and tracing) 
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A few other policies have been evaluated (Policies 6A to 7D as mentioned in previous section). 
Figure 10 compares the behaviour of policy 6C, 6D, 7C and 7D with policy 4A (the best so far). 
It is readily apparent from the figure that policies 6C, 6D and (to some extent) 7C can help 
mitigate the pandemic spread.  These show better projected behaviour than policy 4A.  This 
shows that improved hygiene, social/ physical distancing, usage of masks and other protective 
gear can be quite effective.  Unlike policy 6C (where Home, work and other contacts are at 
50% and schools closed), in policy 7C only schools are closed, while home, work and others 
are back to ‘normal’. However, the relative deterioration is only marginal between 6C and 7C 
(and still better than policy 4A). This again is due to improved hygiene, social/ physical 
distancing, usage of masks and other protective gear.  The practical implementation of this 
policy remains to be seen.  Figures 11 and 12 illustrate the state-wise response to policy 6C 
and 7C respectively.  Policy 6C (see figure 11) is effective in readily controlling the pandemic 
spread. Although policy 7C (figure 12) shows an increasing rates, the growth is not 
exponential but asymptotic (which is a good thing, means the pandemic will not go out of 
control). 
 
Do note that all the policies (such as increased testing/ contact tracing/ use of masks etc.) 
discussed in this section are assumed to be working in perpetuity. 
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Figure 10: Simulation output of all India behavior for other policies vs Policy 4A 
 
 
Figure 11: Simulation output of state wise behavior for policy 6C (50% reduction in contacts, school closed, increased 
testing/ tracing; improved use of masks and better hygiene) 
 
Figure 12: Simulation output of state wise behavior for policy 7C (Only schools are closed, increased testing/ tracing; 
improved use of masks and better hygiene) 
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9. Summary and the Way Forward 
For the Covid-19 pandemic in India, contrary to (Singh and Adhikari, 2020), our model shows 
that, even after a 49-day lock-down, some non-trivial number of infections (even 
asymptomatic) will be left and the pandemic will resurface. Only tool that works against the 
pandemic is high rate of testing those who show Covid-19 like symptoms, isolating them if 
they are positive and contact tracing all contacts of positive patients and quarantining them. 
In combination with use of face masks and personal hygiene, contact tracing and isolation 
need not be super accurate. A wide range of combination of contact tracing, isolation, 
quarantining and personal hygiene measures keep the pandemic at bay and imperfections in 
one sphere are easily compensated by better implementation of other measures. This works 
if we keep just the schools closed for 90 days and allow all other activities with reasonable 
social distancing (only 20% improvement compared to base is sufficient). This works well if 
we open work but reduce non-essential contacts to half, while keeping schools closed for 90 
days.  Thus, we recommend that, during the lockdown, appropriate measures are put in place 
to do effective contract tracing, testing and isolations, increase the awareness & responsibility 
among the citizens to abide by social/ physical distancing norms, usage of masks and other 
PPE, better hygiene practices, reduced discretionary trip and improved sanitisation. This is 
will then help keep the pandemic in check while we can slowly reopen the economic activities. 
 
A few immediate future works with regards to modelling, simulation and analysis are (not in 
any particular order): 
• State-wise sensitivity analysis of various policy levers to help the level of adherence/ 
enforcement of each (say, testing, contact tracing, hygiene, usage of masks, sanitisation, 
contact rate reduction, physical distancing, etc.)  
• Explore the impact of quarantining of symptomatics and asymptomatics though 
awareness efforts. 
• Explore the impact of isolating asymptomatics though testing. Currently policy is to test 
only symptomatics.  
• Use of patient case history to improving the model with respect to recovery delays, 
resource use, comorbidity, etc. 
• The changes in y(t) and v(t) to be made endogenous, driven by feedback of the local 
reported cases and/or deaths. 
• Understand and if possible, make explicit in the model the causes for policy resistance and 
unintended consequences. 
 
The Vensim model can be shared on request. 
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Appendix A:  Model Notations and Equations 
 
Table 3: Notations used 
Notation Variable name Description Units 
𝑆𝑖  Susceptibles  Population of age-group i susceptible to virus Person 
𝐸𝑖 Exposed  Population of age-group i exposed to virus, but not 
infective 
Person 
𝐴𝑖  Asymptomatics 
Infectives 
Population of age-group i who are infected, show no 
symptoms, and are infective  
Person 
𝐼𝑖 Infectious 
Symptomatics  
Population of age-group i who are infected and show 
symptoms (mild) 
Person 
𝐻𝑖 Hospitalised Patients Population of age-group i who exhibit serious 
symptoms, tested positive, and are in hospital care 
Person 
𝐶𝑖 Critical Patients  Population of age-group i who exhibit extreme 
symptoms and may need ICU/ ventilator support 
Person 
𝑅𝑖  Recovered  Cumulative population of age-group i who have 
recovered 
Person 
𝐷𝑖 Dead  Cumulative population of age-group i who are dead due 
to the infection 
Person 
𝑄𝑖
𝐴 Quarantined 
Asymptomatics  
Population of age-group i in quarantine who are 
infected, show no symptoms, and are infective  
Person 
𝑄𝑖
𝐼  Quarantined 
Symptomatics  
Population of age-group i in quarantine who are 
infected and show symptoms 
Person 
𝐿𝑖
𝐴 Isolated 
Asymptomatics  
Population of age-group i in isolation who are infected, 
show no symptoms, are infective and tested positive. 
Person 
𝐿𝑖
𝐼  Isolated 
Symptomatics 
Population of age-group i in isolation who are infected, 
show symptoms and tested positive. 
Person 
𝑂𝐻𝑖 Hospitalised Patients 
Overflow 
Population of age-group i who exhibit serious 
symptoms, tested positive, and are in hospital care but 
overflow 
Person 
𝑂𝐶𝑖 Critical Patients 
Overflow 
Population of age-group i who exhibit extreme 
symptoms and may need ICU/ ventilator support but 
overflow 
Person 
𝐷𝐻𝑖 Demand on Hospital Population of age-group i who exhibit serious 
symptoms, tested positive, and requiring hospital care 
Person 
    
𝐼𝑅𝑖 (𝑡) Infection Rate Rate of infection of Susceptible population Person/Day 
𝐼𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Infection Setting 
Rate 
Rate at which exposed individuals become infectious Person/Day 
𝑋𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) External arrivals of 
Asymptomtics 
Rate at which external infected asymptomatics arrive in 
the community 
Person/Day 
𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑖 (𝑡) Incubation Rate Rate at which asymptomatic individuals exhibit 
symptoms 
Person/Day 
𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Disease Progress 
Rate 
Rate at which infectious symptomatics individuals 
becomes serious and move to hospital 
Person/Day 
𝑄𝐴𝑅𝑖 (𝑡) 
 
Quarantining 
Asymptomatics Rate 
Rate at which asymptomatic infectives are quarantined Person/Day 
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𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Isolating 
Asymptomatics Rate 
Rate at which asymptomatic infectives are isolated Person/Day 
𝑄𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Quarantining 
Symptomatics Rate 
Rate at which Infectious Symptomatics are quarantined Person/Day 
𝐿𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Isolating 
Symptomatics Rate 
Rate at which Infectious Symptomatics are tested 
positive and isolated 
Person/Day 
𝑄𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Quarantinee 
Incubation Rate 
Rate at which Quarantined asymptomatic individuals 
exhibit symptoms 
Person/Day 
𝐿𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Isolatees Incubation 
Rate 
Rate at which Isolated asymptomatic individuals exhibit 
symptoms 
Person/Day 
𝑄𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Quarantinee disease 
progress Rate 
Rate at which quarantined infectious symptomatics 
individuals becomes serious and move to hospital 
Person/Day 
𝐿𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Isolatees disease 
progress Rate 
Rate at which isolated infectious symptomatics 
individuals becomes serious and move to hospital 
Person/Day 
𝑊𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Worsening Rate Rate at which hospitalised patients become critical Person/Day 
𝐷𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Dying Rate Rate at which critical patients die Person/Day 
𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 (𝑡) Hospital admissions 
Rate 
Rate at which patients are hospitalised (proper) Person/Day 
𝐻𝐴𝑂𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Hospital admissions 
Overflow Rate 
Rate at which patients are hospitalised (overflow) Person/Day 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Critical admissions 
Rate 
Rate at which critical patients are admitted for critical 
care (proper) 
Person/Day 
𝐶𝐴𝑂𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Critical admissions 
Overflow Rate 
Rate at which critical patients are admitted for critical 
care (overflow) 
Person/Day 
𝑂𝑊𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Overflow Worsening 
Rate 
Rate at which overflow hospital patients become critical Person/Day 
𝑂𝐷𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Overflow Dying Rate Rate at which overflow critical patients die Person/Day 
    
𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Asymptomatics 
Recovering Rate 
Rate at which Asymptomatics recover Person/Day 
𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Symptomatics 
Recovering Rate 
Rate at which Infectious Symptomatics recover Person/Day 
𝑄𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Quarantined 
Asymptomatics 
Recovering Rate 
Rate at which Quarantined Asymptomatics recover Person/Day 
𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Isolated 
Asymptomatics 
Recovering Rate 
Rate at which Isolated Asymptomatics recover Person/Day 
𝑄𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Quarantined 
Symptomatics 
Recovering Rate 
Rate at which Quarantined Symptomatics recover Person/Day 
𝐿𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Isolated 
Symptomatics 
Recovering Rate 
Rate at which Isolated Symptomatics recover Person/Day 
𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Hospitalised patients 
Recovering Rate 
Rate at which Hospital patients recover Person/Day 
𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖 (𝑡) Critical patients  
Recovering Rate 
Rate at which Critical care patients recover Person/Day 
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𝑂𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Overflow Hospital 
patients Recovering 
Rate 
Rate at which overflow Hospital patients recover Person/Day 
𝑂𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) Overflow Critical 
patients  Recovering 
Rate 
Rate at which Overflow critical care patients recover Person/Day 
    
𝑑𝐸𝐴 Average latency 
period 
Average duration when exposed individuals do not 
show symptoms 
Day 
𝑑𝐴𝐼 Average time to 
develop symptoms 
Average duration for asymptomatic infected individuals 
to show symptoms. Note: Incubation period = 𝑑𝐸𝐴 + 𝑑𝐴𝐼  
Day 
𝑑{𝐴𝑄,𝐴𝐿,𝐴𝑅} Average time for 
asymptomatics to 
{quarantine, isolate, 
recover} 
Average duration for an asymptomatics infected 
individual to quarantine (dAQ), isolate (dAL) or recover 
(dAR) 
Day 
𝑑{𝑄𝑄,𝑄𝐴𝑅} Average time for 
quarantined 
asymptomatics to 
{develop symptoms 
or recover} 
Average duration for quarantined asymptomatics 
infected individual to develop symptoms (dQQ), or 
recover (dQAR) 
Day 
𝑑{𝐿𝐿,𝐿𝐴𝑅} Average time for 
isolated 
asymptomatics to 
{develop symptoms 
or recover} 
Average duration for an isolated asymptomatics 
infected individual to develop symptoms (dLL), or 
recover (dLAR) 
Day 
𝑑{𝐼𝐻,𝐼𝑅} Average time for 
infectious 
symptomatics to {be 
hospitalised or 
recover} 
Average duration for infectious symptomatics individual 
to become serious and hospitalise (dIH), or recover (dIR) 
Day 
𝑑{𝐼𝑄,𝐼𝐿} Average time for 
infectious 
symptomatics to be 
{quarantined  or 
isolated} 
Average duration for infectious symptomatics individual 
to be quarantined  (dIQ), or isolated after testing (dIL).  
Day  
𝑑{𝑄𝐻,𝑄𝐼𝑅} Average time for 
quarantined 
symptomatics to 
{hospitalise or 
recover} 
Average duration for quarantined symptomatics 
individual to become serious and hospitalise (dQH), or 
recover (dQSR) 
Day 
𝑑{𝐿𝐻,𝐿𝐼𝑅} Average time for 
isolated 
symptomatics to 
{hospitalise or 
recover} 
Average duration for isolated symptomatics individual 
to become serious and hospitalise (dLH), or recover (dLSR) 
Day 
𝑑{𝐻𝐶,𝐻𝑅} Average time for 
hospitalised patient 
to {become  critical 
or recover} 
Average duration for hospitalised patients to become 
critical (dHC), or recover (dHR) 
Day 
  24 
𝑑{𝐶𝐷,𝐶𝑅} Average time for 
critical patients to 
{die  or recover} 
Average duration for critical patients to die(dCD), or 
recover (dCR) 
Day 
    
𝜆𝑖(𝑡)  Rate of infection of a susceptible individual 1/Day 
𝑁𝑗 Total population of 
agegroup j 
Total Population of age-group j. Note that 
 ∑ 𝑁𝑗
𝑀
𝑗=1 = 1, where M is the number of age-groups 
Person 
𝑁 Total population Total Population of the region Person 
𝑔𝑖  Population fraction Fraction of population in agegroup i Dmnl 
k Reduction in 
infectiousness of 
asymptomatics 
represents the infectivity reduction factor for 
asymptomatics. 
Dmnl 
𝐶𝑖𝑗 Contact rate represents the net contacts per day of age-group i has 
with age-group j in all locations of home, work, school 
and others.  
1/Day 
𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑍 Contact rate of 
quarantined/ 
isolated population 
group Z 
represents the net contacts per day of age-group i has 
with age-group j in all locations of home, work, school 
and others, for quarantined asymptomatics (K=1), for 
isolated asymptomatics (K=2), quanrantined 
symptomatics (K=3), and isolated symptomatics (K=4) 
1/Day 
𝑢{𝐻,𝑊,𝑆,𝑂} Control factor for 
social distancing 
Represents time dependent control measure imposed 
on contacts at home (H), work (W), school (S) and 
other (O) locations, respectively 
Dmnl 
𝑢𝑍,{𝐻,𝑊,𝑆,𝑂} Control factor for 
social distancing of 
quarantined/ 
isolated population 
group Z 
Represents time dependent control measure imposed 
on contacts at home (H), work (W), school (S) and 
other (O) locations, respectively, for quarantined 
asymptomatics (Z=1), for isolated asymptomatics (Z=2), 
quanrantined symptomatics (Z=3), and isolated 
symptomatics (Z=4) 
Dmnl 
𝑝(𝑡) 
 
Infectivity Net probability of a susceptible person getting infected 
with the virus in an interaction with an infectious 
symptomatic individual 
Dmnl 
?̂? Base infectivity Base probability of a susceptible person getting 
infected with the virus in an interaction with an 
infectious symptomatic individual  
Dmnl 
𝑣(𝑡) Control factor for 
hygiene and PPE use 
Represents time dependent control measure due to 
better hygiene and PPE use (e.g. masks), imposed on 
the infectivity  
Dmnl 
𝑓𝑖
𝑆 Fraction developing 
symptoms 
Fraction of asymptomatics developing sympotoms 
from age group i 
Dmnl 
𝑓𝑖
𝐻  Fraction becoming 
serious  
Fraction of Infectious Symptomatics becoming serious 
and get hospitalized, from age group i 
Dmnl 
𝑓𝑖
𝐶  Fraction becoming 
critical  
Fraction of hospitalized patients becoming critical and 
requiring ICU support, from age group i 
Dmnl 
𝑓𝑖
𝐷  Fraction dying  Fraction of critical patients dying, from age group i Dmnl 
𝑓𝑖
𝐶𝑂 Fraction becoming 
critical (overflow) 
Fraction of overflow hospitalized patients becoming 
critical and requiring ICU support, from age group i 
Dmnl 
𝑓𝑖
𝐷𝑂 Fraction dying 
(overflow) 
Fraction of overflow critical patients dying, from age 
group i 
Dmnl 
  25 
𝑓1(𝑡) Control fraction for 
awareness effort on 
asymptomatics 
Represents the time dependent fraction of 
asymptomatics infected who are quarantined through 
awareness efforts.  
Dmnl 
𝑓2(𝑡) Control fraction for 
testing of 
asymptomatics 
Represents the time dependent fraction of 
asymptomatics infected who are tested positive and 
hence isolated. Note: 𝑓1(𝑡) + 𝑓2(𝑡) < 0.9 
Dmnl 
𝑓3(𝑡) Control fraction for 
awareness effort on 
Symptomatics 
Represents the time dependent fraction of 
Symptomatics who are quarantined through awareness 
efforts. 
Dmnl 
𝑓4(𝑡) Control fraction for 
testing of 
Symptomatics 
Represents the time dependent fraction of 
Symptomatics who are tested positive and hence 
isolated. Note: 𝑓3(𝑡) + 𝑓4(𝑡) < 0.9 
Dmnl 
𝑓𝑋(𝑡) Fraction for contact 
tracing of 
asymptomatics 
Represents the time dependent fraction of 
Asymptomatics who are identified via contract tracing 
and hence quarantined. 
Dmnl 
𝑥(𝑡) Control fraction for 
asymptomatics 
traced per 
symptomatic 
Represents the time dependent control fraction of 
Asymptomatics traced per fraction symptomatic 
tested.  
Dmnl 
𝑦(𝑡) Adjustment factor Represents the time dependent net fraction increase in 
interactions 
Dmnl 
𝐷𝑅𝐶𝑖(𝑡) Daily reported cases A tracking variable to capture the number of new 
infections reported daily 
Person/Day 
𝐶𝑅𝐶𝑖 Cumulative number 
of reported cases 
A tracking variable to capture the cumulative number 
of new infections reported  
Person 
𝐾𝐻 Capacity of hospital 
(bed) 
Number of hospital beds for treating Covid-19 patients 
(non-critical) 
Person 
𝐾𝐶  Capacity of Critical 
care unit 
Number of critical care facility (Ventilators/ ICUs) for 
treating Covid-19 patients (non-critical) 
Person 
𝛿 Time step Simulation timestep (currently set at 0.0625)  
* Note: The units ‘Dmnl’ stands for Dimensionless. 
 
Equations underlying the SD model 
Equations of the stocks  
𝑑𝑆𝑖
𝑑𝑡
= −𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡) 
1 
𝑑𝐸𝑖
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝐼𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑡) 
2 
𝑑𝐴𝑖
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐼𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑋𝐴𝑅(𝑡) − 𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑄𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) 
3 
𝑑𝐼𝑖
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑄𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝐿𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) 
4 
𝑑𝑄𝑖
𝐴
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑄𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑄𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑄𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) 
5 
𝑑𝐿𝑖
𝐴
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝐿𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) 
6 
  26 
𝑑𝑄𝑖
𝐼
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑄𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑄𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑄𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑄𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) 
7 
𝑑𝐿𝑖
𝐼
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐿𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐿𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝐿𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝐿𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) 
8 
𝑑𝐷𝐻𝑖
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑄𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑄𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐿𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) 
9 
𝑑𝐻𝑖
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝐶𝐴𝑂𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) 
10 
𝑑𝐶𝑖
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝐷𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) 
11 
𝑑𝐷𝑖
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐷𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑂𝐷𝑅𝑖(𝑡) 
12 
𝑑𝑂𝐻𝑖
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐻𝐴𝑂𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑂𝑊𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑂𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) 
13 
𝑑𝑂𝐶𝑖
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐶𝐴𝑂𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑂𝑊𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑂𝐷𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑂𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) 
14 
𝑑𝑅𝑖
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑄𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑄𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑄𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡)
+ 𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑂𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑂𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) 
15 
  
Equations underlying the Infection Rate (IR)  
𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑆𝑖(𝑡) ∗ 𝑝(𝑡) ∗ 𝜆𝑖(𝑡) 16 
𝜆𝑖(𝑡) = ∑ [(1 − 𝑘) 𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝐴𝑗
𝑁𝑗
+ 𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝐼𝑗
𝑁𝑗
+ 𝐶𝑖𝑗
1
𝑄𝑗
𝐴
𝑁𝑗
+ 𝐶𝑖𝑗
2
𝐿𝑗
𝐴
𝑁𝑗
+ 𝐶𝑖𝑗
3
𝑄𝑗
𝐼
𝑁𝑗
+ 𝐶𝑖𝑗
4
𝐿𝑗
𝐼
𝑁𝑗
]
𝑀
𝑗=1
 
17 
𝐶𝑖𝑗 = [𝑢
𝐻(𝑡)𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝐻 + 𝑢𝑊(𝑡)𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑊 + 𝑢𝑆(𝑡)𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑆 + 𝑢𝑂(𝑡)𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑂] ∗ 𝑦(𝑡) 18 
𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑍 = [𝑢𝑍,𝐻(𝑡)𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝐻 + 𝑢𝑍,𝑊(𝑡)𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑊 + 𝑢𝑍,𝑆(𝑡)𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑆 + 𝑢𝑍,𝑂(𝑡)𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑂] ∗ 𝑦(𝑡),      for Z𝜖{1,2,3,4}  19 
𝑝(𝑡) = 𝑣(𝑡) ∗ ?̂? 20 
𝑁𝑖 = 𝑁 ∗ 𝑔𝑖  21 
  
Equations of the rates of flow  
𝐼𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3(𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝐸𝐴) 22 
  
𝑄𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = (𝑓1(𝑡) + 𝑓𝑋(𝑡)𝑓4(𝑡)) ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3(𝐼𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝐴𝑄) 23 
𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑓2(𝑡) ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3(𝐼𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝐴𝐿) 24 
𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑓𝑖
𝑆 ∗ (1 − 𝑓1(𝑡) − 𝑓2(𝑡) − 𝑓𝑋(𝑡)) ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3(𝐼𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝐴𝐼) 25 
𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = (1 − 𝑓𝑖
𝑆) ∗ (1 − 𝑓1(𝑡) − 𝑓2(𝑡) − 𝑓𝑋(𝑡)) ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3(𝐼𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡),  𝑑𝐴𝑅) 26 
  
  27 
𝑄𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑓𝑖
𝑆 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3(𝑄𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝑄𝑄) 27 
𝑄𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = (1 − 𝑓𝑖
𝑆) ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3(𝑄𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝑄𝐴𝑅) 28 
  
𝐿𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑓𝑖
𝑆 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3(𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝐿𝐿) 29 
𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = (1 − 𝑓𝑖
𝑆) ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3(𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝐿𝐴𝑅) 30 
  
𝑄𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑓3(𝑡) ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3(𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝐼𝑄) 31 
𝐿𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑓4(𝑡) ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3(𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝐼𝐿) 32 
𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑓𝑖
𝐻 ∗ (1 − 𝑓3(𝑡) − 𝑓4(𝑡)) ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3(𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝐼𝐻) 33 
𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = (1 − 𝑓𝑖
𝐻) ∗ (1 − 𝑓3(𝑡) − 𝑓4(𝑡)) ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3(𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝐼𝑅) 34 
  
𝑄𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑓𝑖
𝐻 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3(𝑄𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑄𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝑄𝐻) 35 
𝑄𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = (1 − 𝑓𝑖
𝐻) ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3(𝑄𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑄𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝑄𝐼𝑅) 36 
  
𝐿𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖 (𝑡) = 𝑓𝑖
𝐻 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3(𝐿𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐿𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝐿𝐻) 37 
𝐿𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = (1 − 𝑓𝑖
𝐻 ) ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3(𝐿𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐿𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝐿𝐼𝑅) 38 
  
𝑀𝐻𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡) =  
𝐷𝐻𝑖
∑ 𝐷𝐻𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝐴𝑋 (0, (𝐾𝐻 −
∑ 𝐻𝑖𝑖
𝛿
)) 
39 
𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑀𝐼𝑁 (
𝐷𝐻𝑖
𝛿
, 𝑀𝐻𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡)) 
40 
𝐻𝐴𝑂𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑀𝐴𝑋 (0,
𝐷𝐻𝑖
𝛿
− 𝑀𝐻𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡)) 
41 
  
𝑊𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑓𝑖
𝐶 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3( 𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝐻𝐶) 42 
𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = (1 − 𝑓𝑖
𝐶) ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3( 𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝐻𝑅) 43 
  
𝑀𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡) =  
𝑊𝑅𝑖
∑ 𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝐴𝑋 (0, (𝐾𝐶 −
∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑖
𝛿
)) 
44 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑀𝐼𝑁(𝑊𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑀𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡)) 45 
𝐶𝐴𝑂𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑀𝐴𝑋(0, 𝑊𝑅𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑀𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡)) 46 
  
𝑂𝑊𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑓𝑖
𝐶𝑂 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3( 𝐻𝐴𝑂𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝐻𝐶) 47 
𝑂𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = (1 − 𝑓𝑖
𝐶𝑂) ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3( 𝐻𝐴𝑂𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝐻𝑅) 48 
  28 
  
𝐷𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑓𝑖
𝐷 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3( 𝑊𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝐶𝐷) 49 
𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = (1 − 𝑓𝑖
𝐷) ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3(𝑊𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝐶𝑅) 50 
  
𝑂𝐷𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑓𝑖
𝐷𝑂 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3( 𝐶𝐴𝑂𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑂𝑊𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝐶𝐷) 51 
𝑂𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = (1 − 𝑓𝑖
𝐷𝑂) ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌3(𝐶𝐴𝑂𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑂𝑊𝑅𝑖(𝑡), 𝑑𝐶𝑅) 52 
  
𝐷𝑅𝐶𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐿𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑄𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑖 ) 53 
𝑑𝐶𝑅𝐶𝑖
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐷𝑅𝐶𝑖 (𝑡) 
54 
  
𝑓𝑋(𝑡) = 𝑥(𝑡) ∗ 𝑓4(𝑡) 55 
 
Note: Delay3(_input rate_, delay duration_) represents a third-order material delay (DELAY3), 
which is a cascade of three first-order exponential delays, with the delay at each stage is one-
third of the total delay duration.  
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APPENDIX B:  Contact Matrices and related notes. 
 
We use the Social Contact Matrix from (Prem et. al. 2017). However, what we really need is 
the number of interactions per day and not number of contacts and hence we calibrate the 
model and apply a correction multiplier of 1.5 to all the base contact numbers for all four 
spheres viz Home, Work School, and Other given there. Note that this factor of 1.5 is also an 
artificial result of the fact that we take base infectivity to be .015 from (Singh and Adhikari 
2020). Any change in the base infectivity number will have a corresponding impact on the 
base contact correction multipliers. 
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APPENDIX C: Results of State-wise model calibration 
 
State-wise calibration of the model. Only the plot of daily reported cases, and cumulative 
reported cases given here. The blue lines represent the simulation results, and red line 
shows the actual reported cases. 
 
During lockdown, uH(t) = 1, uW(t)=0.3, uS(t)=0, uO(t) =0.3, and 1 otherwise for all states. 
Some observations: 
• Parameter settings for AP, GJ, JK, MP, MH, PJ, TL, and WB are same as All India. 
• Parameter settings for DL, HR, TN are similar to each other; differs from All India only in 
the starting value of y(t). 
• In KA, KL, and RJ the testing fractions and contact tracing, f4(t) = x(t) = 0.5. This is 
reasonable since Kerala model and Bilwara models haves been much praised for their 
effective containment. 
 
Andhra Pradesh   
  
f4(t) = 0.25 
 
x(t) = 0.1 
 
𝑦(𝑡)
= {
2 𝑡 ≤ 15
2 − (
0.8
35
(𝑡 − 15)) 15 < 𝑡 < 50
 
 
Delhi   
  
f4(t) = 0.25 
 
x(t) = 0.1 
 
𝑦(𝑡)
= {
1.6 𝑡 ≤ 15
1.6 − (
0.4
35
(𝑡 − 15)) 15 < 𝑡 < 50
 
 
Gujarat   
  
f4(t) = 0.25 
 
x(t) = 0.1 
 
𝑦(𝑡)
= {
2 𝑡 ≤ 15
2 − (
0.8
35
(𝑡 − 15)) 15 < 𝑡 < 50
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Haryana   
 
 
f4(t) = 0.25 
 
x(t) = 0.1 
 
𝑦(𝑡)
= {
1.6 𝑡 ≤ 15
1.6 − (
0.4
35
(𝑡 − 15)) 15 < 𝑡 < 50
 
 
Jammu and Kashmir   
 
 
f4(t) = 0.25 
 
x(t) = 0.1 
 
𝑦(𝑡)
= {
2 𝑡 ≤ 15
2 − (
0.8
35
(𝑡 − 15)) 15 < 𝑡 < 50
 
 
Karnataka   
  
f4(t) = 0.5 
 
x(t) = 0.5 
 
𝑦(𝑡)
= {
1.5 𝑡 ≤ 15
1.5 − (
0.5
35
(𝑡 − 15)) 15 < 𝑡 < 50
 
 
Kerala   
 
 
f4(t) = 0.6 
 
x(t) = 0.5 
 
𝑦(𝑡)
= {
1.5 𝑡 ≤ 5
1.5 − (
0.5
35
(𝑡 − 15)) 5 < 𝑡 < 40
 
𝑣(𝑡) = 0.8, 𝑡 ≥ 0 
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Madhya Pradesh   
  
f4(t) = 0.25 
 
x(t) = 0.1 
 
𝑦(𝑡)
= {
2 𝑡 ≤ 15
2 − (
0.8
35
(𝑡 − 15)) 15 < 𝑡 < 50
 
 
Maharashtra   
   
f4(t) = 0.25 
 
x(t) = 0.1 
 
𝑦(𝑡)
= {
2 𝑡 ≤ 15
2 − (
0.8
35
(𝑡 − 15)) 15 < 𝑡 < 50
 
 
Punjab   
  
f4(t) = 0.25 
 
x(t) = 0.1 
 
𝑦(𝑡)
= {
2 𝑡 ≤ 15
2 − (
0.8
35
(𝑡 − 15)) 15 < 𝑡 < 50
 
 
Rajasthan   
  
f4(t) = 0.5 
 
x(t) = 0.5 
 
𝑦(𝑡)
= {
2 𝑡 ≤ 15
2 − (
0.8
35
(𝑡 − 15)) 15 < 𝑡 < 50
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Tamil Nadu   
  
f4(t) = 0.25 
 
x(t) = 0.1 
 
𝑦(𝑡)
= {
1.6 𝑡 ≤ 15
1.6 − (
0.4
35
(𝑡 − 15)) 15 < 𝑡 < 50
 
 
Telangana   
  
f4(t) = 0.25 
 
x(t) = 0.1 
 
𝑦(𝑡)
= {
2 𝑡 ≤ 15
2 − (
0.8
35
(𝑡 − 15)) 15 < 𝑡 < 50
 
 
Uttar Pradesh   
 
  
f4(t) = 0.25 
 
x(t) = 0.1 
 
𝑦(𝑡)
= {
1.9 𝑡 ≤ 15
1.9 − (
0.7
35
(𝑡 − 15)) 15 < 𝑡 < 50
 
 
West Bengal   
 
  
f4(t) = 0.25 
 
x(t) = 0.1 
 
𝑦(𝑡)
= {
2 𝑡 ≤ 15
2 − (
0.8
35
(𝑡 − 15)) 15 < 𝑡 < 50
 
 
 
 
